As the British Mandate neared its end, the Jewish Yishuv (community) in Palestine began preparing for the upcoming declaration of statehood. On March 10, 1948, the Haganah General Staff issued a defense plan known as Plan D (Tochnit Dalet). This plan served as the final operational directive for all Haganah brigades. Its goal was to unite and link all Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel into one continuous territorial entity, in anticipation of May 15, 1948, the day the British were expected to leave the country, and the day David Ben-Gurion predicted the Arab invasion would begin.
As part of Plan D, the Alexandroni Brigade was tasked with capturing Arab Kfar Saba, which posed a constant threat to the surrounding Jewish settlements. The Arab village regularly harassed Jewish farmers working in fields and orchards adjacent to its lands. Tensions peaked on May 9, 1948, when Jewish Kfar Saba came under heavy Arab fire. During the assault, three armored vehicles were sent to the settlement’s water well, which was subsequently blown up by Arab forces.
With the attacks intensifying, the Alexandroni Brigade headquarters decided to capture Arab Kfar Saba. The operation was scheduled for May 13, 1948, one day before the official Declaration of the State of Israel, and was therefore named Operation Medina (“State Operation”). The mission was assigned to the brigade’s 33rd Battalion.
As part of Operation Medina, the plan included blocking potential reinforcements - both infantry and armored units - that might arrive from Qalqilya and its surroundings. Additionally, Jewish guard forces were instructed to harass the nearby Arab village of Tira, adjacent to Kfar Hess, with the aim of splitting Arab forces and thereby reducing the pressure that might be exerted on Kfar Saba during the operation.
(Source: Tel Mond Region Heritage Museum Archive; Danieli, Moshe, 2003, “Selected Topics from the War of Independence: The Battle of Tira,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)
Arab Kfar Saba was located approximately 2.5 km northeast of the Jewish city of Kfar Saba. To its northeast, just 2 km away, lay the Arab city of Qalqilya. Arab Kfar Saba posed a constant threat to the security of the surrounding Jewish settlements. Armed Arabs, sometimes aided by the “Arab Liberation Army,” frequently harassed Jews working in the fields and orchards bordering the village. These attacks grew increasingly deadly by the day. The situation became intolerable, leading the Alexandroni Brigade headquarters to decide to capture Arab Kfar Saba. The chosen date was May 13, 1948, one day before the Declaration of the State of Israel, hence the operation’s name: “Operation Medina”.
The brigade’s preparations for the operation included several preliminary steps, among them intelligence gathering on enemy forces in the village, their weaponry, and guard arrangements. In addition, a commander reconnaissance mission was carried out to better understand the enemy’s defenses. There were also reports of coordination between Arab forces in Qalqilya and nearby villages.
On the night of May 12, 1948, company commanders conducted a reconnaissance mission to obtain detailed information about the enemy’s positions. Based on this, the attack plan was finalized:
• Company A from Battalion 1 of the 33rd Battalion would attack the village from the south and west.
• Company B would deploy blocking forces to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements, including armored and infantry units, from the Qalqilya area.
• Another company from the 33rd Battalion would serve as reserve.
• A support company would set up mortars to provide cover for the attacking force.
Due to concerns about potential reinforcements from other Arab villages in the area coming to the aid of Arab Kfar Saba, it was decided to conduct a diversionary harassment attack on the village of Tira. This task was assigned to local Jewish forces, aiming to split Arab forces and prevent those in Tira from assisting Arab Kfar Saba.
This intention is evident from an action report issued by the district commander:
“About an hour ago we received an urgent message from Operations HQ to attack Arab Kfar Saba and Qalqilya.
Accordingly, the operational objectives are:
A. An assault to capture Arab Kfar Saba.
B. Consolidation and continuation of the attack toward Qalqilya.
C. Simultaneously – harassment to split enemy forces.
Assignments:
Company 33 will attack Kfar Saba; Alkh/Gad [a local force] will harass Tira.”
(Source: Gershon Rivlin, Zvi Sinai, eds., Alexandroni Brigade 1947–1949, Maarachot Publishing.)
The original H-Hour was set for the night of May 13, 1948, but it was later decided to deviate from the local plan and launch the attack in broad daylight, eventually taking place in the afternoon of May 13, 1948. Advancing the attack also meant that the harassment operation on Tira had to be brought forward to that same time.
(Source: Tel Mond Region Heritage Museum Archive; Danieli, Moshe, 2003, “Selected Topics from the War of Independence – The Battle of Tira,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)
On November 7, 1947, when it became clear that war would break out, the Haganah organization issued a mobilization order that served as the first step in the establishment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). This order brought about the immediate organization of the Palmach, the field units of the Haganah (Heil Sadeh or Hish), and their integration into five brigades.
The Alexandroni Brigade was assigned responsibility for the central region, stretching from Zikhron Ya’akov to Ramat Gan. This area was divided into four districts: Shomron (Naftali); Emek Hefer (Gad); Sharon (Asher); Yarkon (Ha’ayin)
From February 1948, the brigade included four infantry battalions: 31, 32, 33, and 34, which were formed from the existing Hish companies in each district.
The Emek Hefer district (Gad) encompassed the entire area from Kfar Vitkin to Ra’anana and was later divided into two:
• The Netanya sub-district, headed by Mordechai Elkayam
• The Even Yehuda and Tel Mond bloc sub-district, headed by Eliyahu Rotman Oren
In each village, there was a mobilized unit called a Palm (Pluga Mitnadedet – Volunteer Company), composed of volunteers recruited as needed. This force was subordinate to the regional district, and orders for action were transmitted from brigade HQ through the district to local commanders and Palm units.
(Source: Tel Mond Documentation Museum Archive, Danieli, Moshe, 2003, “Selected Topics from the War of Independence – The Battle of Tira,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)
Kfar Hess is located approximately 1.5 km northwest of Tira. About 600 meters from Kfar Hess, in the direction of Tira, lies a grove of eucalyptus trees situated on a hill, offering a commanding view over Tira. This grove served as the staging and cover point for the attacking force. At the base of the hill, toward Tira, there was a sabra (cactus) field, which formed a dense natural barrier at the outskirts of the village.
On May 13, 1948, at 2:40 a.m., following a staff discussion at brigade headquarters regarding Operation Medina and its implications for the district’s operations, an order was received:
“To assemble 3–4 platoons from the reserve and Palm units and proceed to harass Tira.”
(Source: IDF Archives, File 15-2315/1950, Report on the Tira Operation, 13.5.48.)
The estimated departure time was 4:00 a.m. Due to the tight schedule, a force was immediately assembled, including Palm units from Ein Vered, Kfar Hess, and Bnei Dror. In addition, a reinforcement from the Alexandroni Brigade composed of men from Kfar Vitkin and Even Yehuda joined. In total, ten squads were formed into three platoons. The company commander for the operation was Avraham Bartzky (“Topik”) from Even Yehuda.
The district’s mobilized force consisted of three platoons:
• The first platoon was stationed in Tel Mond.
• The second platoon was split between Kfar Yona and Geulim.
• The third platoon, which was untrained, was assigned to security duties in the Emek Hefer farms.
According to reports, all units completed their preparations by 5:30 a.m. The assembled force gathered in the grove at Kfar Hess, where they waited for the order to advance toward Tira at 9:30 a.m.
(Source: Tel Mond Documentation Museum Archive, Danieli, Moshe, 2003, Selected Topics from the War of Independence – The Battle of Tira, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)
The Battle of Tira can be divided into two main phases:
Phase A involved the approach and positioning in the eucalyptus grove, while
Phase B was the continued advance of the lead platoon toward Tira and its entrapment in an Arab ambush.
Phase A:
At 09:30, an order was received to move toward Tira. The three platoons began advancing in column formation from the grove in Kfar Hess, moving through vineyards and fields toward the hill ridge where the eucalyptus grove was located. The lead platoon, composed of fighters from Kfar Hess, was commanded by Lt. Michael Shavit (nicknamed Manda). At 11:20, an observation post at the Kfar Hess water tower reported that the lead platoon had reached the eucalyptus grove.
The other two platoons arrived approximately ten minutes later and took up positions as well. Upon arrival, the platoon commander stationed two mortars on the ridge, and all soldiers dug in and spread out, followed by the remaining two platoons. The objective at this stage was to hold the position and, upon receiving the order, open fire on the village. From this vantage point, all of Tira was visible, and the impression was that the village was quiet and inactive.
At this point, according to testimonies, a shot was accidentally fired from one of the weapons. However, no return fire was triggered, reinforcing the belief that the village was unguarded.
Phase B:
Under the impression that the village was empty and unguarded, the lead platoon was ordered to advance toward the cactus fields and olive groves on the outskirts of Tira. The three squads of the lead platoon began moving toward the village, with the squads from Kfar Hess and Ein Vered on the flanks, and the Bnei Dror squad serving as the central and rear element. The remaining two platoons stayed behind in the eucalyptus grove, awaiting orders.
As the lead squads progressed and reached a distance of only about 200 meters from Tira, they suddenly came under intense fire from the front and flanks - including light and automatic weapons. At that point, the battle spiraled out of control. Many fighters were wounded or killed, and those who remained alive were pinned down by heavy fire. Despite this, they tried to evacuate the wounded.
In a later interview, platoon commander Michael Shavit (Manda) described the scene from his perspective:
“We had maybe advanced 50 meters when fire opened up from the front and the right. I saw my comrades on both sides getting hit, wounded, killed. There were screams everywhere. It was extremely hot. There were insects in the air. And then each of us grabbed a wounded fighter and started dragging them back… All three of my squad leaders were killed.”
The retreat back to Kfar Hess began as a spontaneous initiative by several fighters. Some managed to evacuate the wounded to the eucalyptus grove and return to rescue additional casualties.
The battle ended by evening, with our forces withdrawing to Kfar Hess. Wounded and fallen soldiers who could not be evacuated due to the heavy fire were left behind. Further attempts to search the area yielded no results. Even three days later, when the Red Cross was asked to assist in locating the fallen, it encountered Arab resistance.
In the course of the battle, 24 fighters were killed, 4 remain missing to this day, and many others were wounded.
(Source: Tel Mond Documentation Museum Archive, Danielli, Moshe, 2003, “Selected Issues from the War of Independence – The Battle of Tira,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem).
Borlek Israel, Kfar Hess
Bari Yaakov, Ein Vered
Gutman Chaim Emanuel, Bnei Dror
Davidovich Yitzhak, Bnei Dror
Hoffenberg Chaim Meir, Mishmar HaSharon
Weinstein Ezra, Tel Yitzhak
Weissman Mordechai, Ein Vered
Waldman Zvi, Kfar Hess
Hasid Zvi
Yagnetinsky Amiram, Kfar Hess - Missing
Cohen Pinchas, Ein Vered - Missing
Karmeli Binyamin
Litwin Ze’ev, Bnei Dror
Lifin Yitzhak, Kfar Vitkin
Notti Zvi Avraham, Netanya
Pitel Reuven, Kfar Hess - Missing
Feinstein Zvi, Tel Yitzhak
Friedler Aryeh, Tel Yitzhak
Koperminz Yehezkel
Kantor Shraga, Even Yehuda
Kaplan Moshe, Even Yehuda
Karsel Yechiel Michael, Kfar Hess - Missing
Shapira Yaakov, Bnei Dror
Bekenstein Yaakov, Kfar Hess - Killed one day after the battle